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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in medical science and technology have resulted in the
availability of a vast array of medical devices for use by physicians, health care
professionals, and the ultimate health care consumer. This technological
explosion has been described as the "new frontier" in medical science, with
1Associate at Williams, Jilek, Lafferty & Gallagher Co., L-P.A., in Toledo, Ohio. Ms.
Mesner practices in tort litigation, including medical malpractice, product liability, and
personal injury litigation. She is also a registered nurse.
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important implications for our national economy.2 In 1970, it was estimated
that anywhere from five hundred to five hundred thousand medical devices
were being produced by thirteen hundred to five thousand different
manufacturers. 3 Approximately five thousand medical devices enter the
market every year.4
The biomedical technology explosion has resulted in the development of
many lifesaving technologies. However, these new technologies have also
resulted in a rising number of consumer injuries related to defective medical
devices. In 1970, a study performed by the Cooper Committee revealed
accounts of some 10,000 injuries related to medical devices over a period of six
years.5 Seven hundred thirty-one of these injuries resulted in death: 512 deaths
and 300 injuries were attributed to heart valves; 89 deaths and 186 injuries to
heart pacemakers, and 10 deaths and 8,000 injuries to intrauterine devices.6
More recently, approximately 18,000 deaths and illnesses were attributed to
medical devices in the first year mandatory reporting was implemented by the
FDA.7 It has been estimated that only forty-six percent of the problems related
to medical devices have been reported to device manufacturers in the past.8
Many of these injuries have resulted from implantable devices. For example,
between 1977 and 1982, 15,000 defective pacemaker units were recalled.9
Congressional studies of Bjork-Shiley heart valves in 1990 revealed that heart
valves were marketed long after defects in their design became evident.10 In
2S. REP. No. 242, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6337,
6344.
3Mary G_ Boguslaski, Classiflcation and Performance Standards under the 1976 Medical
Device Amendments, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 421, 423 (1985), citing, Pilot, Retnarks on
Medical Devices, 25 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 466, 470 (1970).
4H.R. REP. No. 808, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6305, 6307.
5The Cooper Committee was a panel charged in 1969 with the task of reviewing the
need for additional medical device legislation. After hearing the views of the medical
community, the industry, and consumer representatives, the Cooper Committee
recommended device legislation to provide for standard setting and premarket
clearance for medical devices. SeeS. REP. No. 33,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1975), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1076-1077.
61d. at 1076.
7H.R. REP. No. 808, 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 13-14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6305, 6311.
8!d.
9 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON AGING, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE
IN THE MEDICARE PACEMAKER INDUSTRY, 26 (Comm. Print 1982).
10See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., THE BJORK-SHILEY HEART VALVE: "EARN As YOU
LEARN (Comm. Print 1990).
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addition, consumers have reported injuries resulting from other implantable
devices, including breast prostheses and collagen implants.11
While recognizing the enormous potential of the medical device industry on
our national economy, Congress has acknowledged the need to protect the
public from harm related to defective or ineffective medical devices. In 1938,
the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter "FD&C Act") provided the Food
and Drug Administration (hereinafter "FDA") with limited authority to
regulate the medical device industry.12 In 1976, largely in response to the
Cooper Committee findings, Congress enacted a more comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme, embodied in the Medical Device Amendments (hereinafter
"MDA") of 1976.13 The 1976 Amendments were subsequently amended by the
Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 and the MDA of 1992.14 In addition, the FDA
has promulgated extensive federal regulations related to medical devices. 15
Despite these concerted efforts to protect consumers from injuries related to
defective medical devices, injuries resulting from defective and dangerous
medical devices continue to be reported in the medical and legal literature.16
Recently, at the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment's November 6,
1989 hearing, General Accounting Office Comptroller General Charles A.
Bowsher stated, "[Ojur work reveals several shortcomings in both the
premarket review and postmarket surveillance system for medical devices and
raises serious questions about the ability of these systems and related
regulations to protect the American people from unsafe and ineffective medical
devices."17 In light of the difficulties Congress and the FDA have encountered
in regulating the device industry, the issue of consumer injuries resulting from
defective devices becomes paramount.
11 See, e.g., Wolff v. Dow Coming Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13 (D. Conn. 1989); Stamps v.
Collagen Corp., No. H-90-2242, 1991 WL 352421 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 1991); King v.
Collagen Corp., No. 90-12718-MA, 1992 WL 98292 (D. Mass. Feb. 2,1992).
12 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter FD&C Act), ch. 675,52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.).
13 FD&C Act, ch. 675,52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended by, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360-360(k) (1976),
and Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, P.L. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511, and Medical Device
Amendments of 1992, P.L. 102-300, 106 Stat. 239.
14 1d.
15See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 800-1050 (1992).
16Prior to 1986, a voluntary reporting system of device related injuries revealed
20,000 injuries over a nine year period. In comparison, 18,000 reports were received by
the FDA's device surveillance program during the first year in which mandatory
reporting was implemented. Speech by Chester Reynolds to the Food and Drug Law
Institute (June 25,1987), ci ted in Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device
Regulation, 2 HARV. L.J. & TECH., 1, n.223 (1989).
171d. at 1, n.I. See also H.R. REP. No. 808,101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, n.1 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6308.
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The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between federal
medical device regulation and state common law tort actions. Specifically, the
issue to be addressed is whether the Medical Devices Act and regulations
promulgated thereunder preempt state law damage actions broughtby injured
consumers against device manufacturers.
An analysis of the preemptive provision of the Medical Devices Act and case
law construing this provision is set forth below. The United States Supreme
Court's recent preemption analysis in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.18 will be
used as a guide in establishing a useful method for determining whether state
tort claims arising out of consumer injuries resulting from defective medical
devices are preempted by the Medical Devices Act.
II. PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON STATE TORT
ACTIONS
A. The Federal Preemption Doctrine: Relationship Between Federal and State Laws
The relationship between the federal and state laws is governed by the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.19 Under the authority of
the Supremacy Clause, Congress has the power to preempt state authority by
passing legislation expressly stating its intent to do so. "'[T]he purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of pre-emption analysis."20 "Congress'
intent may be 'explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained
in its structure and purpose.' ' 21 When Congress has expressly stated its intent
to preempt state law in a given area of regulation, courts may be faced with the
difficult task of determining the scope of preemption in a given context.22 In
making this determination, the courts must analyze the specific language of
the act in light of a presumption against preemption of state police powers.23
Where Congress has not clearly expressed its intention to preempt state law,
courts may determine that Congress impliedly preempted state law in a given
area. Preemption may be implied when a court finds that Congress intended
18 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
19 The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2. provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the Constitution or the Laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.
20Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,
504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
21 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977).
22 See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608, discussed infra at 7-17
23Cipollow, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
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to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state law,24 when state and federal
laws conflict,25 or when compliance with both the state and federal law is
impossible.26
Courts are less likely to find federal preemption in areas traditionally
relegated to state police powers.2 71n these types of cases, Congress must exhibit
a "clear and manifest" intent to preempt state law governing the same subject
matter.28 When Congress has not expressly stated its intention, there is a
presumption against preemption.29 The presumption against preemption is
stronger with respect to state and local regulation of matters related to health
and safety, which are traditionally regulated by the states.30
The growth of federal regulatory agencies requires courts to also consider
the preemptive effect of federal regulations issued pursuant to Congressional
statutory authority. In general, when Congress has given an agency authority
to act, the resulting federal regulations have no less preemptive effect than the
federal statutes.31 However, judicial deference to administrative
interpretations of a statute is not total. The courts remain the final authorities
on issues of statutory interpretation and are not required to approve an
administrative interpretation. 32 Regulations which are unauthorized by the
enabling legislation or inconsistent with the underlying statute should not be
24Abbot v. American Cyanamid, 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
908 (1988) (federal preemption of state law occurs if Congress implies that it has
preempted state law by occupation of entire field of regulation, but concluding that there
is no preemption of vaccine-related design defect and failure to warn claims).
25see Florida Lime & Avacado Growers v. Paul, Inc., 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (statute
governing maturity of avocados was not preempted by federal marketing laws since
there was no actual conflict between state and federal law).
26Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1109 (federal preemption of state law occurs if compliance with
state and federal law is impossible, but failing to find preemption of vaccine-related tort
claims).
27 See MacGillvray v. Lederle Lab., 667 F. Supp. 743 (D. N.M. 1987).
28Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
29Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 726 (1971).
30See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (an award of punitive
damages against a manufacturer of plutonium products was not preempted by federal
laws regulating the nuclear industry, despite a pervasive federal regulatory and
licensing scheme).
31see City of New York v. F.C.C., 486 U.S. 57 (1988); Hillsborough County, Florida
v. Automated Medical Lab., hIc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
32 New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 384 A.2d. 795
(1978) (analyzing the preemptive scope of the federal regulatory scheme under the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, and concluding that the regulatory scheme
permits a wide variety of conceivable state regulations to remain in effect).
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upheld.33 A regulation should not be given preemptive effect if it appears from
the statute or its legislative history that the regulation is not one that Congress
would have intended. 34
Traditionally, the federal preemption doctrine has been applied to determine
whether a positive federal enactment or regulation preempts a positive state
enactment in a given area. In addition, on at least two occasions the Supreme
Court has considered the issue of whether federal regulations preempt state
tort law claims.
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,35 the United States Supreme Court
considered the preemptive effect of federal regulations on state tort law. The
plaintiff claimed injuries related to unsafe practices at a nuclear power plant.
The Court found that federal law regulating nuclear power plants did not
preempt a claim for punitive damages against a plutonium manufacturer.
Emphasizing the fact that Congress had not provided a federal remedy for
persons injured by the manufacturer's conduct, the Court stated that it was
difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means
of judicial recourse for those injured by such conduct.36
B. The Cipollone Analysis: Federal Preemption of Tort Claims
Recently, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.,3 7 the United States Supreme Court
set forth an intricate analysis of federal preemption of state common law tort
actions with respect to federal labeling requirements on cigarette packages and
cigarette advertising. The Cipollone decision sets forth a useful analysis for
determining the preemptive effect of federal regulation on tort law in other
areas as well. Accordingly, the Cipollone analysis will be used to consider the
preemptive effect of the Medical Devices Act on state tort law actions brought
by consumers who have been injured by defective medical devices.
In Cipollone, the plaintiff, Rose Cipollone, was a lifetime cigarette smoker
who discovered that she was dying of cancer. She and her husband brought a
common law products liability suit against three cigarette companies alleging,
inter alia, strict liability, negligence, intentional tort, and breach of warranty.38
The complaint alleged nine counts arising from state tort law.39 On the whole,
the complaint was grounded in negligence, strict liability, breach of express and
implied warranty, and negligent and intentional misrepresentation.4 0 The
3 3 1d. at 803-04; See also Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
34See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961).
35464 U.S. at 251.
3 61d.
3 7Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
38Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984).
3 9Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986).
401d. at 664.
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negligence claims alleged that the defendant was negligent in testing,
researching, promoting and advertising the cigarettes. The strict liability claims
alleged design defect based on alternative design and risk-utility theory. In
addition, the plaintiff alleged strict liability on the basis of failure to warn of
the hazards of cigarette smoking. Finally, the Cipollones alleged that Liggett
Group had conspired to deprive the public of medical and scientific knowledge
reflecting the dangers associated with cigarettes. 41 The manufacturers asserted
that all of the plaintiffs' claims were preempted by federal warningand labeling
requirements set forth in the Federal Cigarette and Labeling Act.42
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (hereinafter the
"1965 Act") required a conspicuous label warning of the health hazards of
smoking to be placed on every package of cigarettes sold in this country. Section
5 of the Act was a preemptive provision, which provided that:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any
cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in
the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this Act.
This preemptive provision was amended in 1969 to replace section 5(b) with
the following provision: "(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this Act. "44
After a tortuous course of litigation in the lower courts,45 the United States
Supreme Court recognized the manifest importance of the preemption issue
41id. at 665-67.
4 2The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, § 5, as enacted in 1965, was
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334. The Act was subsequently amended by the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. The United States Supreme Court in Cipollone applied
its preemption analysis first to § 5 of the 1965 Act, and then to the amended version in
the 1969 Act. A plurality of the Court concluded that the language of the 1969 Act had
a broader preemptive scope than the 1965 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1334, as construed in Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
4315 U.S.C. § 1334, § 5 (1965).
4415 U.S.C. § 334, § 5(b) (1969).
4 5See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd in part
and remanded in 789 F.2d 181 (1986); motion in limine in 644 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986);
motion to vac denied 802 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1986); on remand 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986);
668 F. Supp. 408 (D.N.J. 1987); Unreported Opinion on Motion in Limine (Oct. 14,1987),
WESTLA W 18451; 56 U.S.L. W. 2272 (Oct. 27,1987); Unreported Memorandum Opinion
and Order of Dec. 28, 1987, WL 31763; 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988); 693 F. Supp. 208
(1988); affid in part, rev'd in part, and remanded in 893 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1990); cert. denied,
Liggett Group, Inc. v. Cipollone, 484 U.S. 976 (1987); cert. denied, Cipollone v. Liggett
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and granted writ of certiorari in order to resolve the conflicting state and federal
rulings on the preemptive effect of federal statutes. 46
The specific issue reviewed by the United States Supreme Court was whether
cigarette manufacturers could be subjected to state tort liability when they had
complied with the warning and labeling requirements required by the 1965 Act
and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (hereinafter the "1969
Act").47 The Court reviewed the nature of the plaintiffs' claims, the procedural
history of the case, the history of the 1965 Act, and the context in which the
amendment to the Act was made.48
The Supreme Court's preemption analysis began with the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution. First, the Court noted that "[c]onsideration
of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal
Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' 49
The Supreme Court noted that, in the absence of an express congressional
command, state law may be preempted only if the law actually conflicts with
the federal law, or it so thoroughly occupies the legislative field that Congress
left no room for the states to supplement it.50 The Court rejected the court of
appeals' implied preemption analysis, and instead stated that, "the preemptive
scope of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act [was] governed entirely by the express
language in section 5 of each Act."5 1 Applying the principle of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius,52 the Court found that "Congress' enactment of a provision
defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that
reach are not preempted.' 53 The Court found no reason to look beyond the
express words of the statute to employ an implied preemption analysis. 54
Since the provisions of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act differed substantially,
the Court analyzed the claims separately under each Act. With respect to the
Group, Inc., 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); cert. granted, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 499 U.S.
935 (1991), rev'd in part, ajI'd in part, and remanded in 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
46Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2608.
471d.
481d. at 2613-17. See, Part I and LU of the opinion.
491d. at 2617 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
50Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617.
511d. at 2618.
52 Latin phrase meaning "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
53 The Court reasoned that, "when Congress has included an express provision
explicitly addressing preemption, and that provision provides a 'reliable indicium' of
congressional intent, with respect to sta tea uthority," (Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 505 (1986)), "there is no need to infer congressional intent to preempt state laws."
(California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)).
54 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
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1965 Act, the Court found that the express terms of the statute prohibited only
statements relating to smoking and health, and that the term statement referred
to the verbatim warning set forth in the statute. Therefore, the 1965 Act "merely
prohibited state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular
cautionary statements on cigarette labels (s. 5(a)) or in cigarette advertising (s.
5(b)),' 55 and did not preempt state damage actions.
In addition to its reliance on the precise words of the 1965 Act, the Court
supported its narrow reading of the 1965 Act by noting the presumptionagainst
preemption of state police powers.56 The Court stated that the fact that
Congress requires a specific warning label does not, of its own effect, foreclose
additional obligations under state law.57 The Court concluded that there was
no general, inherent conflict between federal preemption of state warning label
requirements and the continued vitality of state common law damage
actions.58 Finally, the Court stated that the narrow reading of the 1965 Act
comported with the Act's statement of purpose, and the regulatory context in
which the Act was enacted. 59
Based on this narrow reading of the preemptive provision of the 1965 Act,
the Court concluded that the 1965 Act did not preempt any of Cipollone's state
law damage actions. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court with
respect to Parts I, I1, 111, and IV, concluding that section 5 of the 1965 Act did
not preempt state law damages actions, but superseded only positive
enactments by state and federal rulemaking bodies mandating particular
warnings on cigarette labels or in cigarette advertising. Justices Rehnquist,
White, O'Connor, Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter joined in the majority
opinion with respect to the 1965 Act.60
justice Stevens, writing for himself and Justice Rehnquist, White, and
O'Connor, then proceeded to analyze the preemptive scope of the 1969 Act.61
He found the language of the 1969 Act, which barred "requirement[s] or
prohibition[s] ... imposed under State law" much broader than the language
551d.
56Id.
571d.
58 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
591d. at 2619.
60Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas dissented from the majority opinion with respect
to the 1965 Act. In particular, they rejected the presumption against preemption of state
police power regulations. They felt that the preemptive provision should be interpreted
in accordance with its apparent meaning, and that doing so with respect to the 1965 Act
would preempt the petitioner's failure-to-warn claims. Cipollonc, 112 S. Ct. at 2632.
61Id. at 2619.
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of the 1965 Act. 62 In addition, the Court noted that the 1969 Act reached beyond
statements "in the advertising" of cigarettes to obligations "with respect to the
advertising or promotion" of cigarettes. 63 Based on the broader language and
the context in which these changes were made, the Court concluded that the
1969 Act worked substantial changes in the preemptive scope of the federal
law.64
Justice Stevens noted that the phrase "requirement or prohibition" suggested
no distinction between positive enactments and common law.65 In the Court's
mind, this was the major distinction between the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act.66
He reasoned that "the common law would not normally require a vendor to
use a particular statement, . . . it is the essence of the common law to enforce
duties that are either affirmative requirements or negative prohibitions."67
Furthermore, Justice Stevens concluded that the term "state law" includes
common law, as well as statutes and regulations. 68
Justice Stevens did not find that the 1969 Act preempted all common law
claims, however. Instead, he stated that the Court must "fairly but-in light of
the strong presumption against pre-emption-narrowly construe the precise
language of section 5 (b) and... look to each of petitioner's common law claims
to determine whether it is in fact pre-empted. 69 The proper inquiry, he
announced, was "whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common
law damages action constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health... imposed Linder State law with respectto ... advertising
or promotion' giving that clause a fair but narrow reading.' 70
Justice Stevens then proceeded to consider each category of the plaintiffs'
claims. 71 He found that Cipollone's claims that the cigarette manufacturers
were negligent in the manner in which they tested, researched, sold, promoted,
and advertised their cigarettes, and the claim that the manufacturers failed to
provide "adequate wamings of the health consequences of cigarette smoking"72
621d.
631d.
64 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619.
65Id. at 2620.
66[d,
67[d.
68 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2620.
691d. at 2621.
701d.
71The Court did not consider the design defect claims, since those claims had been
barred on other grounds. However, the Court noted that § 5(b) "does not generally
pre-empt state-law obligations to avoid marketing cigarettes with manufacturing
defects or to use demonstrably safer alternative design. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2614.
72 d. at 2621.
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were based on claims for failure-to-warn. He concluded that "insofar as claims
under either failure to warn theory require a showing that respondents'
post-1969 advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more
clearly stated, warnings, those claims [were] pre-empted. 73 Cipollone's claims
relying solely on testing or research practices unrelated to advertising and
promotion, however, were not preempted.74
Next, Justice Stevens addressed the breach of express warranty claim.75 He
noted that, although this claim arose under a New Jersey statute, much of the
petitioner's evidence with respect to the claim consisted of statements made in
respondents' advertising. 76 He emphasized, however, that "the test is not
whether a claim challenges the 'propriety' of advertising and promotion, but
whether the claim would require the imposition under state law of a
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to
advertising or promotion.' 77 Since the manufacturers' liability for breach of an
express warranty arose from a contractual commitment voluntarily
undertaken, it was not a duty "imposed under state law."78 Therefore, the
post-1969 breach of warranty claim was not preempted.
Next, Justice Stevens turned to Cipollone's fraudulent misrepresentation
claims. He found that the petitioner's claim that the manufacturers, through
their advertising, neutralized the effect of federally mandated waming labels
was predicated on a state-law prohibition against statements in advertising and
promotional materials that minimize health hazards related to smoking. 79
Therefore, this cause of action was preempted.
Justice Stevens found that petitioner's other claims, based on intentional
fraud and misrepresentation, were based both on false representations and
concealment of material fact.80 He concluded that the claims based on
concealment were not preempted because they were based on a state law duty
to disclose such facts through channels of communication other than
advertising or promotion .81 In addition, he found that the claims based on false
statements of material fact did not arise from a duty "based on smoking and
health."82 Instead, they arose from the more general duty not to deceive, and
thus, were not preempted.
73 1d.
74 1d.
75Cipollonc, 112 S. Ct. at 2622.
761d.
7 7 1d.
7 8 1,J.
79Cipoflone, 112 S. Ct. at 2623.
801d.
81 Id.
821d. at 2624.
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The only remaining claim, conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal material
facts, was also not preempted.83 Justice Stevens found that this claim was based
on an underlying duty not to conspire to commit fraud, and was not a
prohibition "based on smoking and health."84
Justice Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter concurred in the opinion with
respect to the express warranty, intentional fraud, misrepresentation, and
conspiracy claims.85 They felt that the 1969 Act did not provide the clear
mandate necessary to preempt any of Cipollone's state common law damage
actions.86 Furthermore, they noted that common law damage remedies exerted
only an indirect regulatory effect on manufacturers, and damage actions were
not clearly and unambiguously "requirements" or "prohibitions" imposed
under state law.87 In their opinion, neither the 1965 Act or the 1969 Act should
have preempted any of petitioner's claims.88
In addition, Justice Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter criticized the Court for
creating a "crazy quilt of pre-emption" from among the common law claims
implicated in this case, a result that Congress surely did not intend.89
Furthermore, they felt that the Court's opinion readjusted the state-federal
relations, and impinged on the state's traditional ability to protect the health
and safety of its citizens.90
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, on the other hand, felt that all of
Cipollone's failure-to-warn claims were preempted under the 1965 Actand that
all of Cipollone's claims should be preempted under the 1969 Act.91 They
criticized the Court for announcing two "new principles." First, they took issue
with the principle that express preemption provisions should be given a
narrow construction. Instead, they felt that the language of the statute should
be given its plain meaning.92 Secondly, the dissenters criticized the Court's
reliance on express preemption, and the Court's refusal to employ the well
established rules of implied preemption.93 Finally, Justice Scalia and Thomas
83 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2624.
841d.
85 d. at 2625.
861d.
87Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625.
881d.
89 d. at 2631.
901d.
91Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2632-38.
92 d. at 2632.
931d. at 2633.
[Vol. 7:253
MEDICAL DEVICE TECHNOLOGY
expressed concern over the "difficulty lower courts would encounter in
attempting to implement the decision" announced by the Court.94
Since the announcement of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Cipollone, the Court's preemptive analysis has been applied to other federal
regulatory schemes in an effort to determine their preemptive effect on state
law damage actions. For example, the preemptive scope of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),95 particularly on state law
failure-to-warn claims, has been addressed by the federal courts. 96 The
pertinent statutory language in FIFRA provides that a state "shall not impose
or continue in effect any requirement for labeling.., in addition to or different
from those required under this subchapter."97 In a pre-Cipollone decision
addressing the preemptive scope of FIFRA, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, using an implied preemption analysis, affirmed the District
Court's ruling granting summary judgment to Upjohn Co. on the issue of
preemption.98 Papas appealed to the Supreme Court and following its decision
in Cipollone that Court vacated the decision in Papas and remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals.99 On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit applied an express preemption analysis and held that FIFRA expressly
preempted the Papas' claims. 100
The Cipollone analysis may also provide a useful framework for evaluating
the preemptive scope of the FDA's regulatory scheme governing the
manufacture and marketing of medical devices. This issue is of particular
concern, given the number of serious injuries and deaths attributable to
medical devices. With this in mind, the remainder of this paper will focus on
the preemptive scope of the MDA and regulations promulgated thereunder on
state law damage actions arising from defective medical products.
9 4 1d. at 2637.
957 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-13 6y (1993).
96 See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293 (1982), aff'd, Ferebee
v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
977 U.S.C.A. § 136y (1993).
98 Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded sub. nom,
Papas v. Zoecon Co., 112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992) (on authority of Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608
(1992)); affd, Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993) (on authority of
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992)).
99 Papas, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
10OPapas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993).
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III. PREEMPTIVE EFFECT OF THE FOOD DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT, MEDICAL
DEVICE AMENDMENTS OF 1976, 1990, AND 1992
A. Legislative Analysis of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments and Subsequent
Amendments of 1990 and 1992
The Food and Drug Administration, an agency within the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, bears primary responsibility for regulation of
medical devices. The overriding objective of the agency is the protection of the
public from potential health hazards resulting from adulterated and mislabeled
foods, cosmetics, medical devices and drugs.
Legislation regulating medical devices was first passed in 1938.101 The
purpose of the 1938 Act was "to prohibit the movement in interstate commerce
of adulterated and misbranded food, drugs devices, and cosmetics.' 10 2 A
device was considered to be "adulterated" if it was subjected to insanitary
storage, packaging, or manufacturing conditions, and "misbranded" if its
labeling was false or misleading in any particular, or if the device did not bear
adequate directions for use.103
In addition to the regulations set forth under the provisions of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter "FD&C Act") of 1938, concerns about the
safety and effectiveness of medical electronic and radiation products were
addressed by Congress in the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of
1968.104 Under the authority of this Act, the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare was directed to prescribe performance standards on a
product-by-product basis, as he deemed necessary to reduce the exposure of
the public to unnecessary hazardous radiation from electronic products.105
Although violation of the provisions of the 1938 FD&C Act was a criminal
offense, the enforcement measures under the Act were inadequate because the
FDA had no regulatory power under the provisions of the 1938 Act to institute
premarket approval measures, or to promulgate specific standards applicable
to specific medical devices. Attempts to regulate the industry under the 1938
Act were limited to seizure of misbranded or adulterated devices on a
case-by-case basis, injunctive measures, and criminal prosecutions with the
impbsition of fines on noncomplying manufacturers. 106
101See FD&C Act, ch. 675,52 Stat. 825 (1938).
1021d.
1031d. at 1050, § 502(a) and § 502(0 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) and § 352(f)
(1993), respectively).
104Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act P.L. No. 602, 82 Stat. 1173 (1968)
(current version at 21 U S.C. §§ 360gg-360ss (1993)).
105S. REP. No. 1432, 90th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1-2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4312, 4313.
106See Paul G. Rogers, Medical Device Lau--Intent and Implementation, 36 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 4 (1981).
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As the medical device industry grew, the regulatory measures set forth in
the 1938 Act were found to be inadequate. In 1976, a Congressional Committee
headed by Theodore Cooper reported a finding of 10,000 recorded injuries
resulting from medical devices, with 731 resulting in death. 107 Research
performed by the Emergency Care Research Institute showed that,
the problems associated with most medical devices which may lead to
adverse effects, including injury or death, are, in order of decreasing
incidence: (1) Operator error resulting from inadequate training, (2)
deficiencies in repair maintenance inspection and control of devices
within health care facilities, (3) fundamental design deficiencies, and
(4) deficiencies in manufacturing quality control.0 8
The Cooper Committee recommended additional legislation to require
standard setting and pre-market clearance for medical devices.109 These
changes were designed to strengthen the FDA's regulatory powers and to
provide additional remedies which the FDA could employ to remove defective
or dangerous devices from the market.
In response to the findings of the Cooper Committee, Congress passed the
MDA of 1976.110 The 1976 Amendments set forth a comprehensive regulatory
scheme, setting forth rulemaking procedures for the development of general
controls and performance standards for many medical devices. 111 A formal
licensing scheme for premarket approval of the most dangerous products was
also established. 112 In addition, the 1976 MDA regulatory scheme established
postmarket remedial measures1 13 and procedures for judicial review of actions
undertaken by the agency.114
The regulatory scheme of the MDA of 1976 establishes three broad
classifications of medical devices. First, the Amendments set forth general
regulatory controls applicable to all medical devices. These include product
registration,1 1 5 product reporting requirements, 116 good manufacturing
107S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, at 1076.
1081d. at 1077.
1091d.
110Medical Device Amendments [hereinafter "MDA"I of 1976, (Pub. L. No. 94-295),
90 Stat. 439 (1976), as codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360-360(k), has been subsequently
amended by the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511
and the MDA of 1992, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 106 Stat. 238.
1111d. For a thorough analysis of the formal and informal rulemaking processes
established in the MDA. See Leflar, supra note 16, at 1.
112See FD&C Act § 515, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360e.
113See FD&C Act § 517, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360h.
114 See FD&C Act § 517, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 3 60g.
115FD&C Act, § 510, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360.
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practices, 117 and regulations governing adulterated and misbranded
devices.118
Under the provisions of the 1976 MDA, the least hazardous devices were
classified as Class I medical devices. 119 These devices were to be regulated only
through the general regulatory controls, provided that, (1) the controls were
sufficient to provide a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness, and
that (2) the device was not purported to be for a use in supporting or sustaining
human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing
impairment of human health, and does not present a potential unreasonable
risk of illness or injury.120
Under the initial regulatory scheme, if general controls were deemed to be
insufficient to provide a reasonable assurance of safety, the product was
classified as a Class II medical device, provided that there was sufficient
information available to establish a performance standard to provide the
assurance of safety.121 The FDA was given the authority to promulgate
performance standards for Class 1I devices, mainly through informal notice
and comment procedures. The development of performance standards under
the 1976 Amendments, was not mandatory, however, and the FDA had the
option of adopting existing standards, or of accepting proposals by industries
or outside organizations to develop performance standards. 122
Class III devices, the most hazardous category, are defined as those devices
for which there is insufficient information to establish a performance standard
for the reasonable assurance of safety, and the device was "purported... to be
for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or presents
a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury"123 Class III medical devices
were subject to full premarket approval by the FDA. 124
Under the provisions of the 1976 Act, the FDA was charged with the
authority to classify all medical products into one of the three categories, and
ll 6FD&C Act, § 510(k), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).
117FD&C Act, § 520(0, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(o, and Regulations promulgated
thereunder, 21 C.F.R. Part 820.
118FD&C Act, § 501, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 351; 21 U.S.C. § 352; FD&C Act, § 502,
codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352.
119Boguslaski, supra note 3, at 422.
1201d. at 425.
121MDA of 1976, § 510(a)(1)(B), as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(a)(1)(B). The 1976 Act
has subsequently been amended by the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-629, 104 Stat. 4511, and the MDA of 1992, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 106 Stat. 238.
122MDA of 1976, § 514(0, as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360d(f), providing that "the
Secretary may... proceed to develop a proposed performance standard."
123FD&C Act, § 513(a)(1)(C), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(a)(1)(C).
124FD&C Act, MDA of 1976, § 515, as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360e.
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to promulgate appropriate performance standards and premarket approval
procedures as required for the reasonable assurance of safety of a medical
device marketed in interstate commerce. This task proved to be more difficult
than anticipated. The original panels which reviewed all preenactment medical
devices placed 62% of the currently marketed devices into Class II, which
required the development of performance standards for the reasonable
assurance of safety to the consumer of the product.125
In addition to classification according to the degree of hazard a device posed,
the Act created seven other categories of devices.1 26 Devices were grouped
according to whether they were pre-amendment, post-amendment, or
substantially equivalent. Pre-amendment devices127 were to be classified into
one of the three groupings discussed above. The Act created a presumption
that a pre-amendment device would be placed in Class I unless greater
regulation was necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of a device.128
Post-amendment devices129 were automatically to be placed in Class III unless
the device was shown to be "substantially equivalent' to a device already on
the market.130 Upon a showing of substantial equivalence, devices were to be
placed in the same category as their pre-amendment counterpart. 13 1
Furthermore, the Act created separate categories for implantable, custom,
investigational, and transitional devices. 132 Implantable devices, such as
pacemaker generators were placed in Class II1.133 Devices which had been
regulated as drugs prior to the enactment of the Medical Devices Act were
labeled as "transitional" devices, and were automatically placed in Class III, but
could be reclassified into Class I or 11 upon a specific showing by the
manufacturer that the lesser classification was sufficient to ensure a reasonable
degree of safety.134 Custom devices specifically designed for a particular
patient were exempt from performance standards and premarket testing, and
12 5 Boguslaski, supra note 3, at 426 (citing Medical Devices Law & Regulation 216 (S.
Weitzman ed. 1981)); 21 U.S.C. § 360(a)(1)(B).
126For an excellent discussion of the significance of each of these classifications, see
generally David A. Kessler, et al., The Federal Regulation of Medical Devices, 317 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 357 (1987).
12 7Pre-amendment devices refer to devices marketed before the effective date of the
Medical Devices Act on May 28, 1976.
128 FD&C Act, § 513, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)(2)(c)(i).
12 9Post-amendment devices refer to those devices that were new and were placed on
the market after the effective date of the Medical Devices Act on May 28, 1976.
13 0FD&C Act, § 513(0, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f).
13 1See Kessler, et al., supra note 126, at 358.
132 1d.
13321 C.F.R. § 812.3(d) (1992).
134 FD&C Act, § 520(l)(1), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(l)(1).
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upon proper application and approval, investigational devices could also be
exempted from regulation. 13 5
Due to the overwhelming complexity of the classification scheme, as well as
inertia on the part of the FDA, the MDA of 1976 never accomplished their
intended goal. Congressional Oversight Hearings which took place in 1982 and
1983 revealed that the FDA had failed to carry out the Congressional intent.136
Performance standards for Class II medical devices had not been promulgated.
Furthermore, many manufacturers of Class III products availed themselves of
the abbreviated premarket notification procedure set forth in section 360k of
the Act, rather than the more thorough, burdensome premarket approval
process set forth in section 360c of the Act. 137 As a result, unsafe and defective
medical products continued to be marketed in interstate commerce and
abroad. 138
Congress has repeatedly attempted to strengthen the FDA's compliance and
implementation of regulatory activities under the MDA. Despite these
regulatory attempts, marketing of products which are hazardous to consumer
safety has continued. Congress' most recent attempts to strengthen FDA
regulatory activities are reflected in the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 and
the MDA of 1992.139 These amendments impose more stringent reporting
requirements for device related injuries on device manufacturers and users.140
In addition, the 1990 enactment substitutes a variety of "special controls" for
Class I devices which may be imposed in lieu of or in addition to the prior
"performance standards" approach required under the 1976 MDA.141 The 1990
Act also clarifies the definition of "substantial compliance" required in order to
qualify for the abbreviated section 510 premarket notification process, and
incorporates "design validation" as an additional "good manufacturing
13 5FD&C Act, § 520j(g)(2)(a), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 520j(g)(2)(a).
13 6 See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT'AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON
ENERGYAND COMMERCE, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA's
NEGLECTED CHILD 1, 4 (Comm. Print 1983).
13 7Premarket notification procedures, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k); premarket approval
requirements, 21 U.S.C. § 360e.
138Forty-four percent of the device recalls between 1983 and 1988 related to product
designproblems. H.R. REP. No. 808,101st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1990) (citingMedical Device
Recalls: An Overviewv and Analysis 1983-1988, General Accounting Office,
GAO/PEMD-89-15BR, 23-24, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6326).
139 MDA of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat .439 (1976), as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)
et seq., has been subsequently amended by the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 and the MDA of 1992, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 106 Stat. 238.
140 See Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, §§ 2-3, 104 Stat. 4517 et
seq. (1990), amending 21 U.S.C. § 360(i) (1994), MDA of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-300, 106
Stat. 238 (1992), § 15, amending 21 U.S.C. § 360(i) (1994).
141Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 5, 104 Stat. 4511, 4517
(1990), as codified and amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(i).
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practice" concept.142 The 1990 legislation also imposes a timetable for
classifying all preenactment devices and submitting them for premarket
approval.143
Neither the 1990 or the 1992 amendments altered the preemptive provision
of the MDA, as originally set forth in the 1976 Medical Devices Act.144 A careful
examination of this provision is the first step in the analysis of whether state
tort law damage actions are preempted by the Medical Devices Act.
B. Examination of the Precise Language of§ 521(a) of the Medical Device
Amendments
According to the analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,145 an examination of preemption "'start[s] with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
superseded by... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.' 146 "'[Tihe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of
pre-emption analysis."'147 Therefore, the first consideration in the preemption
analysis of the MDA is an examination of the purpose of Congress in enacting
the MDA.
The MDA was enacted in response to growing concerns about injuries
related to defective medical devices. Recognizing that the measures defined in
the FD&C Act of 1938148 were inadequate to ensure that devices on the market
were safe and effective, Congress enacted the MDA to protect the public and
promote safety in the manufacture of medical devices.149
In addition, Congress recognized the importance of encouraging research
and development of new devices, and was concerned that multiple and
conflicting state standards or regulations might impede interstate commerce
with respect to medical devices.150 Section 521(a) of the MDA reflects the
balance that Congress struck in weighing these competing considerations.
142Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 18, as codified and
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f)())(A).
143Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 4, 104 Stat. 4511, 4514
(1990).
144MDA of 1976, § 521k, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, 574 (1976), codified at 21
U.S.C. § 360(k).
145112 S. Ct. at 2608.
1461d. at 2617 (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
1471d. (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504(1978) (quoting Retail
Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
148 See FD&C Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 104 (1938) as codified and amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 301 et seq.
149 See S. REP. No. 33,94th Ccng., 1st Sess. 1 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070.
150 See H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1976).
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Section 521 of the MDA of 1976 governs state and local requirements
respecting devices.1 51 Section 521(a) establishes a three-part test which must
be satisfied in order for preemption to apply.152 First, the state must "establish
or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement."153 (emphasis added). Second, the requirement must be "different
from or in addition to, any requirement applicable" to a device under the Act.154
(emphasis added). Third, the state requirement must relate "to the safety or
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device" under the Act.155 (emphasis added).
The first question which must be addressed in analyzing section 521(a) is
whether this provision is intended to preempt state tort law. The proper inquiry
is whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common law damages
action constitutes "a requirement which is different from or in addition to any
requirement applicable to the device under the MDA, .. . and relates to the
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device," giving that clause a fair but narrow
reading. 156
151MDA of 1976, § 521, Pub. L. No 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 360(k) provides as follows:
General Rule
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) no State or political subdivision
of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement appli-
cable under this Chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device
under this Chapter.
Exempt requirements
(b) Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the
Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity
for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this Section, under such
conditions as may be prescribed in such regulation, a requirement of
such State or political subdivision applicable to a device intended for
human use if-
(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this
Chapter which would be applicable to the device if an exemption
were not in effect under this subsection; or (2) the requirement-
(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to
be in violation of any applicable requirement under this Chapter.
152Id.
1531d.
1541d.
155 See FD&C Act, § 521(a), as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1976).
156/d.
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This analysis requires a determination of whether state tort law constitutes
a state "requirement" within the meaning of § 521. The legislative history of the
MDA does not contain any direct evidence that Congress, in enacting
section 521(a), intended to preempt state tort law. 157
The original version of the MDA was introduced in 1973.158 The preemptive
provision of the amendments, as originally introduced, referred to "standard[s]
or regulation[s]," instead of using the term "requirement. 159 This version,
introduced as S. 2368, was recommended for passage by the Senate in 1974, but
the House of Representatives was unable to complete its deliberations on the
legislation that year.160 Identical legislation was reintroduced in 1975 as S.
510.161 S. 510 was passed by the Senate, but upon introduction to the House of
Representatives, an amendment was proposed which struck out all of the
Senate Bill after the enacting clause and inserted the substitute text of H.R.
157See Lindquist v. Tambrands, 721 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (D. Minn. 1989).
158Senator Kennedy introduced S. 2368 in 1973. Two other versions of the legislation
known as the Javitz-Administration Bill (S. 1446) and the Nelson Bill (S. 1337) were
introduced for consideration. Neither the Javitz nor the Nelson version of the 1973 Act
contained a preemptive provision comparable to the current version of § 521 of the
Medical Devices Act. The Kennedy version was reintroduced as § 510 in 1975, and was
approved by the Senate. However, the House substituted the current version of § 521
during its deliberations. Hearings on S. 2688, S. 1446, S. 1337 Before the Subconn. on Health
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1079-1116 (1973)
(comparison of legislation).
159The 1973 version of the Act is published in Medical Device Amendments, 1973:
Hearings on S. 2368, S. 1446, S. 1337, Before the Subconin. on Health of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1973). The 1975 version of the Act is
published in the Hearings Before the Subcomni. on Health and the Env't of the Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
76-78 (1975). The 1973 and 1975 versions of the Amendments also contained exemption
provisions which were similar to the exemptions in § 521(b). The 1973 preemptive
provision provided that,
Sec. 903 (a) Whenever a standard pursuant to section 513 or scientific
review pursuant to section 514 under this Act is in effect, no State or
political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to
establish or to continue in effect any provision ofa standard or regulation
which prescribes any requirements as to the performance, composition,
content, design, finish, construction, packaging, or labeling of such pro-
duct which are designed to deal with the same device unless such
requirements are identical to the Requirements of the Federal require-
ments. (emphasis added).
Section 903(a) was intended to,
[Prohibit] States from establishing or maintaining standards or regulations
for any device which is specifically subject to an official Federal standard
or scientific review, unless State requirements are identical to the Federal
requirements.
160 See S. REP. No. 94-33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1070.
1611d.
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11124.162 This version of the Amendments contained the preemptive provision
which was ultimately enacted as section 521 of the Medical Devices Act of
1976.163
The legislative history of section 521(a) indicates that the Senate version was
intended to preempt state "standard[s] or regulation[s]." 164 The term
"regulation" generally refers to positive enactments, and not to common law
damages actions.165 Therefore, it seems that Congress did not originally intend
the Medical Device Amendments to preempt state tort law.
Section 521(a) as enacted, however, preempts any state "requirement" that is
"different from or in addition to a requirement applicable" to the device under
the MDA. The language of the enacted version of the MDA has been given a
broad reading. For example, the FDA has promulgated regulations defining
the scope of preemption under section 521. The Code of Federal Regulations,
Chapter 21 Part 808.1(b) interprets section 521(a) in the following manner:
Section 521(a)... prescribes a general rule that.., no State or political
subdivision. .. may establish or continue in effectany requirement with
respect to a medical device intended for human use having the force and
effect of law (whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court
decision), which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable to such device under any provision of the act and which
relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter
included in a requirement applicable to the device under the act.
166
Under the FDA's interpretation of section 521(a), state "court decisions"
having the full force and effect of law are preempted. The FDA's reading of
section 521 as preempting court decisions has generally been interpreted by the
courts to include state tort law.167
However, one federal district court has rejected the FDA's broad
interpretation of the term "requirement" within the meaning of section 521 of
162Hearings on Health and Env't on H.R. No. 39 Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1975); seealso, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1090, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1103.
163 Upon introduction of § 510 to the House of Representatives, a substitute Bill H.R.
11124 was introduced which contained the current version of § 510(a). The Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce deliberated on the proposed changes and
recommended passage of the bill with the new version of§ 510(a). A further explanation
of this section is published in SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, S.
REP. No. 853,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976) (minority view) (no mention of state tort law
is made in the Committee Report).
164 See supra note 159.
165See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
16621 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1992).
16 7See, e.g., Stamps v. Collagen, 984 F.2d 1416, 1420-21 (1993).
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the MDA. 168 In Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co.,169 the plaintiff brought an action to
recover for injuries she sustained as the result of the use of an intrauterine
device. The IUD was a transitional device under the MDA, since it had been
regulated as a drug prior to the 1976 Amendments. The plaintiff sued to recover
for her injuries on the theories of negligence, strict liability, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and breach of warranty.
The court in Callan analyzed the language and the legislative history of the
preemptive provision of the MDA, and concluded that the provision does not
preempt state tort claims.1 70 Although the court took note of the FDA
regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b), cited above, it found that the regulation
conflicted with the plain language of the statute, contradicted Congressional
intent, and was not based on a permissible construction of the statute.171
The court in Callan stated that,
The plain language of § 360k indicates that Congress intended to
preempt state or local legislation and administrative regulations
governing devices, not state tort law. The common law is never
mentioned, and there is no provision of a federal remedy for those
wrongfully injured by the devices.
The legislative history of § 360k further supports the view that
Congress did not intend to preempt state tort law. In a report by the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, this
"supremacy" provision is specifically discussed and establishes that
Congress intended the term requirement to refer to legislative and
administrative "programs" governing the sale and distribution of
devices, not to state common law.17
The court in Callan concluded that the plaintiff's state tort claims were not
preempted either by the FD&C Act or by the MDA to the FD&C Act.1 73
More recently, however, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, has reached the opposite conclusion.1 74 In Slater v. Optical Radiation
Corp.,175 the plaintiff sustained injuries as the result of a defective intraocular
lens implant which had subsequently been removed from the market. The
intraocular implant was an investigational device, which had been exempted
from the premarket approval process pursuant to section 520(g) of the MDA.
168FD&C Act, § 521(a), as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1976).
169 Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989).
1701d.
1711d. at 667-68.
1721d. at 667 (citing H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 45-46 (1976)).
173 Cailan, 709 F. Supp. at 668.
174Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 327 (1992).
175Id"
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The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the implant, alleging that the device had
not been adequately tested, that the device was defectively designed, and that
the manufacturer had failed to warn the consuming public of the dangers of
the implant.
The district court in Slater dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff
was seeking to impose, in the name of Illinois tort law, requirements relating
to the effectiveness of an intraocular lens that were different from the
requirements imposed by FDA regulations governing the experimental use of
intraocular lenses.176 The Court of Appeals affirmed.177 With respect to the
plaintiff's claim that the device had not been adequately tested, Judge Posner
concluded that "[i]f the FDA in a valid regulation under the Medical Device
Amendments requires X, and X relates to safety or effectiveness, a state cannot,
whether through statute, regulation, or common law decision, require non-X,
or X±Y."178 Judge Posner concluded that state tort law is a "requirement" with
respect to the preemption provision of the MDA. 179
The Slater decision is consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in
Cipollone v. Liggett.180 In Cipollone, the Court analyzed the preemptive effect of
a federal statute which stated that "[n]o requirement or prohibition ... shall be
imposed under State law."181 After examining the language of the statute, the
Court concluded that the "[tihe phrase '[n]o requirement or prohibition'
sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and
common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that
take the form of common law rules."182 Furthermore, the Court stated that,
"[wihereas the common law would not normally require a vendor to use any
specific statement on its packages or in its advertisements, it is the essence of
the common law to enforce duties that are either affirmative requirements or
negative prohibitions."183 Therefore, under Slater and Cipollone, a state
"requirement" within the meaning of section 521(a) should be interpreted to
include state tort law requirements.
Not all state and local "requirements" are preempted by the MDA, however.
The regulations promulgated by the FDA interpreting section 521(a),
176Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 756 F. Supp. 370, 372 (I11. D. Ct. 1992), afftd, 961
F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327 (1992) (disagreeing with the only
other case at the time of the decision concern'ing the preemptive force of an exemption
for an investigational device, Mitchell v. Iolab Corp., 700 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. La. 1988)).
177SIater, 961 F.2d at 1330.
1781d. at 1333.
179jd.
18OCipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
1811d. at 2611 (construing Federal Cigarette and Labeling Act as amended b7y Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1993)).
1821. at 2620.
1831d.
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specifically exclude certain state or local "requirements" from preemption
under section 521(a).184
For example, the regulations expressly preclude laws of "general
applicability" from the scope of preemption under section 521(a).185 It is not
clear whether state product liability laws should be considered as "local
requirements of general applicability" which "are not limited to devices" within
the exception noted in 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1). 186 Courts which have addressed
the issue of preemption under the MDA have not specifically addressed this
18421 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(1)-(9) (1992), provides in pertinent part:
There are other State or local requirements that affect devices that
are not preempted by section 521(a) of the act because they are not
"requirements applicable to a device" within the meaning of section
521(a) of the act. The following are examples of State or local require-
ments that are not regarded as preempted by section 521(a) of the act:
(1) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local requirements of
general applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates to
other products in addition to devices (e.g. requirements such as general
electrical codes, and the Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of fitness)),
or to unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not limited to
devices.
(2) Section 521 (a) does not preempt State or local requirements that are
equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under
the act.
(6)(ii) Generally, section 521(a) does not preempt a State or local require-
ment prohibiting the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded
devices. Where, however, such a prohibition has the effect of
establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device, e.g. a
specific labeling requirement, then the prohibition will be pre-
empted if the requirement is different from, or in addition to, a
Federal requirement established under the act. In determining
whether such a requirement is preempted, the determinative
factor is how the requirement is interpreted and enforced by the
State or local government and not the literal language of the statute,
which may be identical to a provision in the act.
The Proposed Rules, which were published prior to the formal adoption of 21 C.F.R.
§ 808.1(d)(1), provide additional background on this section. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30,383,
30,384 (proposed June 4, 1977). The Proposed Rule applicable to § (d)(1) states that,
[ilncluded in this category are general fire and electrical codes,
the Uniform Commercial Code warranty requirements, and State or
local unfair trade practice laws and regulations whose requirements
apply to commodities in addition to medical devices... There is no
indication in the legislative history of section 521 ... that Congress
intended that the section would preempt general purpose safety codes
and similar statutes that only incidentally apply to devices.
1 8 5 See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (1993).
1 8 6 The Commissioner of the FDA issued Proposed Rules for Exemptions from Federal
Preemption of State and Local Requirements that provide a further explanation of the
interpretation of § 521(a). The Commissioner expressed his opinion that § 521(a) was
intended to preempt only State or local laws that directly and specifically relate to
devices. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,383 (proposed June 14, 1977).
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issue. Instead, they have concluded that state tort law "requirements" are
preempted to the extent that they "relate to safety and effectiveness of a device,"
within the meaning of section 521(a)(2). 187
In Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp.,188 for example, the Seventh Circuit held
that the plaintiff's state law claims based on negligence, strict liability, and
breach of implied warranty were preempted by investigational device
exemption to the extent that the state law claims were based on safety or
effectiveness. Similarly, in King v. Collagen Corp.,18 9 the First Circuit concluded
that the plaintiff's strict liability claims would impose requirements related to
the safety and effectiveness of the product Zyderm, and were therefore,
preempted.
The final test for preemption, set forth in section 521(a)(1), is that, in order
to be preempted, a state requirement must be "different from or in addition to
any requirement applicable under this Act to the device."'190 (emphasis added). This
branch of the section 521(a) analysis presents the most difficult part of the
preemption analysis.
In this respect, the FDA has promulgated interpretive regulations which
provide some guidance.191 The regulations provide that,
State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and
Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or
there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under
the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local
requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to,
the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. (emphasis
added). 192
Therefore, the general requirements set forth in the MDA are insufficient to
warrant a finding of preemption. If a specific regulation or requirement
applicable to a particular device has been established by the FDA, however, the
specific federal requirement preempts any state requirement which is different
from or in addition to the federal requirement.
In order to determine the scope of preemption under the MDA, it is necessary
to examine the specific requirement or regulation applicable to a device under
the federal regulations. If the state law requirements imposed by a state tort
187See Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d. 1416, 1422 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that
"Stamps' state law claims undoubtably 'relate to' either the safety or effectiveness of
Zyderm or Zyplast," an implantable collagen device); Accord King v. Collagen Corp.,
No. CIV.A. 90-12718-MA, 1992 WL 98292 (D. Mass. Feb. 3,1992), affd, 983 F.2d 1130 (1st
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993).
188961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992).
189983 F.2d. 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).
190FD&C Act, § 510k, as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1976).
19121 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1992).
192/d.
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claim would be "in addition to or different from" a specific requirement under
the MDA, and relate to the "safety or effectiveness of a device," then the state
tort claim is preempted under section 521(a). 193 The Cipollone analysis provides
a useful method for determining the scope of preemption with respect to
particular state tort law claims.
C. Scope of Preemption: Application of Cipollone Preemption Analysis to Specific
Devices under the Medical Device Amendments
As noted above, the MDA of 1976 required the FDA to classify all medical
devices into three categories.' 94 The classification is to be based on the degree
of hazard the device posed to a consumer of the product. Class I devices are
subject only to general controls set forth in the Act. Class II are subject to
"performance standards," other "special controls" which the FDA deems
necessary and appropriate to ensure a reasonable degree of safety. Class III
devices, the most hazardous products, are subject to the premarket approval
procedures prior to marketing the device in interstate commerce.
195
In order to determine the scope of preemption for a specific medical device,
it is necessary to apply the Cipollone analysis to Class I, II and III devices under
the MDA. This analysis requires an examination of each common law claim to
determine whether it is in fact preempted. The central inquiry in each case is
whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common law damages action
constitutes a requirement that is "different from, or in addition to," a specific
requirement applicable to the device under the MDA. In addition, an inquiry
needs to be made whether the requirement "relates to safety or effectiveness of
the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the
device under [the Medical Devices Act]." 196
The first step in analyzing the scope of preemption under the Medical
Devices Act is a determination of the classification of the device, and the
identification of any specific requirements or regulations applicable to the
device under the MDA. The classifications applicable to specific medical
devices are found in the Code of Federal Regulations. 197 The devices have been
organized into sixteen different categories: clinical chemistry and clinical
toxicology devices, hematology and pathology devices, immunology and
microbiology devices, anesthesiology devices, cardiovascular devices, dental
devices, ear, nose and throat devices, gastroenterology-urology devices,
general and plastic surgery devices, general hospital and personal use devices,
neurological devices, obstetrical and gynecological devices, ophthalmic
devices, orthopedic devices, physical medicine devices, and radiology
193See FD&C Act, § 521, as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1976).
194See Boguslaski, supra note 3, at 421.
19 51d.
196See FD&C Act, § 521(a)(1), as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360K(a)(1)(1976).
19721 C.F.R. §§ 861-92, Subch. H (1992).
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devices.198 The classification of a specific device is listed under the category
applicable to that device.
Class I Devices
If a device is classified as a Class I product, it is only subject to general
regulatory controls under the MDA. 199 The FDA regulations specifically state
that a state requirement is not preempted unless there is a specific requirement
applicable to a particular device under the Act.200 Since, by definition, Class I
products are not subject to any specific requirements applicable to the device,
any requirements imposed under state tort law should not be preempted by
section 521(a) of the MDA.
Class II Devices
Class II products require a more detailed analysis. Approximately 62% of the
devices originally classified under the Act were placed in the Class II
category.2 01 By definition, the FDA may promulgate "performance standards"
for Class II devices to ensure a reasonable degree of safety. A performance
standard may require the use and prescribe the form and content of labeling
for the proper installation, maintenance, operation, and use of a device.202 A
performance standard may also include design specifications. 203 In addition,
in 1990, Congress amended section 513(a) of the Act20 4 to allow the FDA to
regulate Class II devices through "special controls" which may or may not
include the promulgation of a performance standard applicable to a particular
device.
Very few performance standards have actually been promulgated for
particular Class II devices, despite their classification as such.20 5 In the absence
of a particular performance standard, the device is subject only to the general
regulatory controls that govern Class I devices. Therefore, the mere
classification of a device as a Class II device is insufficient to warrant
preemption.
If the FDA has promulgated a specific "performance standard" or other
"special control" that is applicable to a particular device, then state tort claims
will be preempted to the extent that they impose requirements that are different
1981d. §§ 862-92.
199 See Boguslaski, supra note 3, at 428.
2 00 See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d).
2 01See Boguslaski, supra note 3, at 426.
20221 U.S.C. § 360d(a)(2)(c) (1976).
2031d.
204 See Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 6, as codified at 21
U.S.C. § 360 (a)(1) (1990).
205See Boguslaski, supra note 3, at 426; Kessler, supra note 113, at 362 (attributing the
FDA's failure to develop performance standards to the complex administrative
rule-making procedures and noting that the development of performance standards for
over 800 types of Class H devices would require 50,000 staff years).
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from or in addition to the requirements under the Act, and relate to the safety
or effectiveness of the device.206
Under the Cipollone analysis, in order to determine whether a specific state
tort claim related to a Class II product is preempted by the Medical Devices
Act, it is necessary to compare the specific requirement applicable to the device
under the MDA to each of the plaintiff's common law tort claims. If the legal
duty upon which the state tort claim is predicated imposes a requirement that
is different from or in addition to the requirement under the MDA, then the
tort claim will be preempted.
For example, tampons have been classified as Class II devices by the FDA. 207
In addition to classifying tampons as a Class II device, the FDA has
promulgated warning and labeling requirements specifically applicable to
tampons.208 Since a state law failure to warn claim would impose requirements
different from or in addition to the specific warning and labeling requirements
applicable to tampons under the Medical Devices Act, a failure to warn claim
is preempted by the Medical Devices Act and the regulations promulgated
thereunder.
This analysis is consistent with court decisions which have considered the
issue of preemption with respect to tampon-related toxic shock syndrome
claims. In those cases, courts have generally found that a plaintiff's failure to
warn claims are preempted by specific warning and labeling requirements that
have been promulgated by the FDA.209 As long as the manufacturer has
complied with the FDA's labeling and warning requirements, the plaintiff's
claims based on failure to warn are preempted. 210 Tampon-related claims based
on negligent design and testing, defective design, and breach of implied
warranty however, have generally been held not to be preempted under the
Act.2 11
Prior to 1989, the FDA had not promulgated any specific requirements
applicable to tampons that related to the design or manufacture of the product.
206See FD&C Act, § 521(a), as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1976).
20721 C.F.R. § 884.5460 (1992).
20821 C.F.R. § 801.430 (1992).
209See, e.g., Krause v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 749 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Mich. 1990);
Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 676 F. Supp. 731 (W.D. La 1987), modified by 867 F.2d.
243 (5th Cir. 1989), rch'g deied 873 F.2d. 297; Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672
F. Supp. 907 (D. S.C. 1987); Edmonson v. International Playtex, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1571
(N.D. Ga. 1987); Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ind: 1988);
Cornelison v. Tambrands, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1989); Lindquist v.
Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Minn 1989).
210See, e.g., Lavetter v. International Playtex, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 722 (D. Ariz. 1988);
Meyer v. International Playtex, Inc. 724 F. Supp. 288 (D. NJ 1988); Northrip v.
International Playtex Inc., 750 F. Supp. 402 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
211See, e.g., Krause, 749 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Moore v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 867 F.2d. 243 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Therefore, design defect claims werenot preempted. In 1989, however, the FDA
promulgated additional regulations applicable to tampons which impose
requirements related to the manufacture and design of tampons.212 Therefore,
as long as the manufacturer complies with these regulations, design defect
claims related to tampons should also be preempted after the effective date of
the additional regulations.
Class III Devices
Class III products present additional considerations with respect to the
preemption analysis under section 521(a) of the Medical Devices Act. Class III
devices, the most dangerous of the devices, are generally governed by the
premarket approval process. 213 The procedure for premarket approval, as
required under section 515 of the MDA, is established in the Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 814.214
The premarket approval process is a review process requiring a
manufacturer to submit an application for approval of his device before
marketing.215 The FDA may require the manufacturer to submit safety and
effectiveness data, protocols for tests and studies, and a list of product
components. 216 Furthermore, the manufacturer may be required to submit all
proposed labeling for the device. 217 Compliance with specific performance
standards may also be required. After a formal review process by a selected
panel, a premarket application may be approved or denied by the FDA.218
If the device is approved for marketing under the premarket approval
process, the manufacturer must file a supplement to its premarket approval
application prior to making any changes affecting the safety and effectiveness
of the device.219 Furthermore, the manufacturer is under a continuing duty to
determine whether the device, including its labeling, is safe and effective.220
The question presented by claims arising from Class III devices is whether
a litigant's product liability claims are preempted by the fact that a device has
been subjected to the premarket approval process. To resolve this question, it
is necessary to consider whether the premarket approval process constitutes a
specific requirement applicable to the device under the Medical Devices Act.
In this respect, the legislative history of the original 1973 Amendments,
introduced as S. 2368, indicates that a state requirement would be preempted
21221 C.F.R. § 801.439 (1992).
2 13See FD&C Act, § 515, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360(e) (1993).
21421 C.F.R. § 814.1 (1993).
215Id. § 814.
2 161d. § 814.20.
2 171d. § 814.20(b)(10).
21821 C.F.R. § 814.
2 19 Id. § 814.39.
2 2 0 1d. § 814.39.
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for any device which is "subject to an official Federal standard or scientific
review, unless the state requirement is identical to the Federal requirement. 22 1
Since the premarket approval process includes scientific review by a panel of
experts, the premarket approval process should be deemed to be a specific
"requirement" applicable to the device under the MDA. Therefore, if a device
has been subjected to the premarket review process, a tort claim relating to the
safety and effectiveness of a device is preempted to the extent that it imposes
requirements in addition to or different from the premarket approval
process. 22 2
For example, two federal district courts have considered the issue of whether
a consumer's product liability claims for injuries related to implantable
collagen, 223 a Class III device, were preempted by the MDA. In Stamps v.
Collagen Corp.,224 the plaintiff alleged that the collagen implants were defective
as manufactured, that the defendant failed to provide adequate labeling or
other warning of the defects, and that the use of the defective implants caused
her injury. Based on the fact that collagen was a Class III device, the District
Court for the Southern District of Texas concluded that all of the plaintiff's
claims were preempted. 22 5 The court based its decision on the fact that collagen
was a Class IlI device subject to premarket approval procedures. As such, the
court stated, the manufacturer was "required to provide comprehensive
information to the FDA, including information regarding design,
manufacturing methods, proposed packaging and labeling, and data from
premarketing laboratory tests and clinical investigations.' 226 Furthermore, the
court concluded that the premarket approval process was a specific
"requirement" applicable to the device under the Act.
227
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
holding in Stamps, and concluded that the premarket approval process for
22 1Medical Devices Amendments: Hearings on S. 2368 Before the Subconmm. on Labor
and Public Welfare of the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1114 (1973) (comparison
of Medical Device legislation).
222Collagen Implants, 20 Prod. Safety Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 803 (July 21, 1992).
223Collagen is a product made from processed cow tissue and used for medical
wrinkle treatments. The tort actions brought against the manufacturer of this product
alleged that women injected with the collagen developed a rare autoimmune disease,
dermatomyositis/polymyositis after being injected with the product. See King v.
Collagen Corp., No. CIV.A.90-12718-MA, 1992 WL 98292 (D. Mass. Feb. 2, 1992), affd
983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993).
224Stamps v. Collagen Corp., No. H-90-2242, 1991 WL 352421 (SD. Tex. Oct. 11, 1991),
affd, 984 F.2d. 1416 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993).
225Stamps, 1191 WL 351421 at *2.
226/d. at *1.
227Stanps, 984 F.2d at 1421.
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Class III medical devices preempts state tort causes of action to the extent they
related to the safety, effectiveness, or other MDA requirements. 22 8
Subsequently, in King v. Collagen Corp.,229 the Massachusetts District Court
adopted the reasoning set forth in Stamps, supra. In that case, the plaintiff, Jane
King alleged that she suffered from an autoimmune disease as a result of
injections of the implantable collagen, Zyderm. She asserted seven claims. She
alleged that the Zyderm was not safe for its intended purpose, and was
unreasonably dangerous to its users. Second, she alleged that the Zyderm was
sold in breach of the warranty of merchantability. In addition, she alleged
negligence in the design, manufacture, marketing and design of Zyderm. Her
fourth claim asserted that the Zyderm was misbranded or mislabeled. She
further alleged that Collagen had failed to warn her of the defective condition
of the product, had made misrepresentations of material fact, and had
fraudulently obtained FDA approval to market the product. The district court
found that all of the plaintiff's claims were preempted under the MDA. 23 0
King appealed the decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 231 She
argued that her claims were allowed under the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.232 King also claimed that the FDA has
repeatedly stated that state tort laws are not "'requirements... with respect to
a device."' 233 Furthermore, King asserted that, "[a]t the time she received the
implant, there were no FDA requirements governing collagen warning."234
Collagen maintained, however, that the petitioner's claims for negligence,
breach of warranty, and sale of personal property by deceit or fraud were all
based on failure to warn, and were therefore preempted. 235
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, applying the Cipollone analysis,
concluded that all of King's claims were preempted by section 521 of the
MDA.236 First, the court analyzed the specific language of section 521(a) of the
MDA, noting that "[tihe language of subsection (a) and the definition of state
requirement promulgated under it demonstrate a field of preemption which is
broad, but limited."237 The court concluded that the plaintiff's tort claims were
2281d. at 1423-24.
229King, 1992 WL 98292 at *1.
2301d.
231King, 983 F.2d at 1130.
232 King v. Collagen Corp., 20 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30 at 803 (July 31,
1992).
2331d.
234/d.
235Id.
236King, 983 F.2d at 1130.
2371d. at 1134.
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preempted because "[any state requirement which, in effect, establishes a new
substantive requirement for the device in a regulated area... is preempted."238
With respect to King's strict liability claims, the court concluded that "[tihe
entire MDA scheme for ... Class III devices.., is aimed at determining and
regulating the intended purpose of the device, and at ensuring a reasonable
level of safety for its users."23 9 Since the claims based on strict liability would
require the court to conclude that collagen was unsafe and dangerous, despite
a contrary determination by the FDA, the court concluded that the strict
liability claims were preempted.240
With respect to the breach of warranty claims, the court distinguished
Cipollone from the preemption analysis under the MDA on the basis that "the
MDA imposed much more extensive regulation on class III device
manufacturers" than the warning requirement which was in issue in
Cipollone.24 1 The court reasoned that "[t]he FDA retains rigid control over the
entirety of the labeling and packaging of class III products, largely displacing
the ability of manufacturers to make additional claims."242 Therefore, it
concluded that the breach of warranty claims were preempted. 243 Similarly,
King's claims based on negligent design, manufacture, marketing, and sale
were found to be preempted on the basis that the MDA regulates these aspects
of Class III medical devices in an extensive way.244
The court then turned to the claims based on product misbranding,
misrepresentation, and failure to warn. Since the FDA must reject product
labeling that is "'false or misleading in any particular,"' these claims were
preempted.24 5 The court concluded that the "MDA forecloses these claims
because Collagen cannot be forced to change zyderm's.. . labeling by virtue
of these state law damage claims." 246
Finally, the court considered the appellant's claim that Collagen had
fraudulently obtained premarket approval for marketing of the device. The
fraud claim was based on a Massachusetts statute which required privity with
the seller.247 The court rejected the fraud claim on the basis that King was not
238Id. at 1134-35.
2391d. at 1135.
240King, 983 F.2d at 1135.
241Id.
242h&
2431d.
244King, 983 F.2d at 1136.
2451d.
2461d.
2471d. (citing Mass. Gen. ch. 231 § 85J as construed Kourouvacilis v. General Motors
Corp., 410 Mass., 706, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991)).
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in privity with the seller.248 In addition, the court noted that the fraud claim
was basically a failure to warn claim, which sought to impose additional
packaging and labeling requirements on the manufacturer, and was therefore,
preempted by the MDA.249
Although the court's conclusion that King's claims based on strict liability,
negligence, and failure to warn are consistent with the preemption analysis in
Cipollone,250 its analysis of the breach of warranty claims and fraud claims is
difficult to reconcile with Cipollone. First, the court in King v. Collagen
251
acknowledged that the Supreme Court's holding in Cipollone252 seems to
require a finding of no preemption with respect to King's claims based on
breach of express and implied warranties. 2 53 In Cipollone, the Court specifically
found that the petitioner's claims based on express warranty were not
preempted because a manufacturer's breach of express warranty derives from
the terms of the warranty, and are not imposed under state law.254 In reaching
this conclusion, the Court stated that, "a common law remedy for a contractual
commitment voluntarily undertaken should not be regarded as a'requirement'
imposed under state law."255 Applying this same reasoning to the preemption
analysis under the MDA would seem to require a conclusion that King's
express warranty claim was not preempted.
In addition, the court's finding of preemption with respect to King's claim
that the product was not fit for its intended purpose, is difficult to reconcile
with the FDA's own specific regulations governing the preemptive scope of
section 521(a) which states that, "[slection 521(a) does not preempt State or local
requirements of general applicability where the purpose of the requirement
relates either to other products in addition to devices (e.g., requirements such
as general electrical codes, and the Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of
fitness))." 256
The First Circuit did not discuss the significance of this regulation in reaching
its conclusion that the petitioner's warranty claims were preempted.2 57
Furthermore, the First Circuit's conclusion that the petitioner's claims based
on fraud were preempted is surprising, in light of Cipollone. In Cipollone, the
Court concluded that the petitioner's claims that Liggett concealed material
248King, 983 F.2d at 1136.
249Id.
250112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
251983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).
252112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
253 King, 983 F.2d at 1135.
254112 S. Ct. at 2622.
255 1. at 2622.
25621 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1) (1992).
257King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).
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information were not preempted because the claims were not based on a duty
related to smoking and health, but instead, were predicated on the more
general duty not to deceive.258 Similarly, in the Collagen cases, it would seem
that the petitioner's claims based on fraudulent misrepresentation should not
be preempted. This is because the state law claim based on fraud arises out of
a general state law duty not to deceive, and not a requirement based on the
safety or effectiveness of a device. The First Circuit, however, rejected this
application of Cipollone, and held that all of the appellant's state law claims
including warranty and fraud claims, were preempted by the MDA.259
In summary, most state tort law claims arising out of Class III devices which
have undergone premarket approval are preempted by the MDA. Claims based
on failure to warn, defective design, and inadequate testing, are preempted.
Although breach of warranty claims may also be preempted under the First
Circuit's analysis in King v. Collagen Corp.,260 the FDA regulations indicate that
Uniform Commercial Code claims based on breach of warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose are not preempted.261 In addition, although the court in
King v. Collagen262 held that the plaintiff's fraud claims were preempted, this
result is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.263
Substantially Equivalent Devices
Few devices currently being marketed have been subjected to the scrutiny
of the premarket approval process. According to the legislative history of the
Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, 98% of an estimated 5,000 marketed devices
have entered the market on the basis of a claim by the manufacturer of
substantial equivalence to a pre-1976 device.264 Over 80% of Class III devices
have entered the market on a claim of "substantial equivalence. "265 This means
that many devices have entered the market through an abbreviated premarket
notification process under section 510k of the Act, thereby avoiding the more
rigorous premarket approval process.266
The issue of whether product liability claims based on a Class III device
which entered the market without being subjected to premarket approval are
preempted by the MDA has recently been addressed by the Supreme Court of
258112 S. Ct. at 2624.
259King, 983 F.2d at 1131.
2601d. at 1130.
261 See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1).
262983 F.2d 1130 (1993).
263112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
264H.R. REP. No. 808,101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6305, 6307.
2651d.
266Id.
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Hawaii. 267 In Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc.,268 the plaintiff brought an action
alleging that a pacemaker which had been implanted was defectively designed.
The pacemaker had been tested at normal body temperature during the
product testing and development, and had been found to malfunction at
elevated body temperatures. 269
Because the statute of limitations had run on the plaintiff's tort claim, the
plaintiff's cause of action was based on breach of warranty.270 However, the
court stated that, in order for the plaintiff to bring an action in implied warranty
for personal injury, he must "show product unmerchantability sufficient to
avoid summary judgment on the issue of defectiveness in a tort strict products
liability suit."2 71 The court rejected the manufacturer's argument that the
pacemaker was an unavoidably unsafe product under comment k of
section 402 of the Restatement of Torts.2 72
The court analyzed Pacesetter's defense of federal preemption in light of
section 521 of the MDA, § 808.1 of regulations promulgated by the FDA, and
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone. The court began its
analysis by acknowledging that both section 521 (§ 360k) and § 808.1(d) govem
the scope of preemption under the MDA. 2 73 The Larsen court also
acknowledged that, in the absence of sufficiently specific FDA regulations
pertaining to device design and construction, "state law claims of defective
design, composition and construction... have been found to fall outside the
preemptive scope of section 808.1(d)." 274
The defendant Pacesetter claimed that the plaintiff's claim was preempted
because the pacemaker was a Class III device subject to premarket approval
under the MDA. However, the court rejected this argument, stating that the
'statutes and regulations governing premarket approval set forth general
procedural requirements . . . [which] do not trigger a preemption analysis
under § 808.1(b)." 275 Therefore, the court found that there were no specific
statutes or regulations applicable to the pacemaker in this case. 276
267Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992).
2681d. at 1273.
269IJ. at 1277.
2701d. at 1280.
271 Larsen, 837 P.2d at 1273.
272Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(k) (1990).
273Larsen, 837 P.2d at 1280-81.
274jd.
2 751d. at 1282 (citing Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243,247 (5th Cir. 1989));
Bejarano By & Through Bejarano v. International Playtex, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 443,446 (D.
Idaho 1990).
2 761d. This construction of the preemptive scope of the MDA was rejected by the Fifth
Circuit in Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416,1423 (5th Cir. 1993). The court in Stamps
distinguished Larsen on the basis that the Class I product in Larsen entered the market
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Furthermore, the court stated that, although the pacemaker was a Class III
device under the Act, it had entered the market on a claim that it was
"'substantially equivalent' to a device already on the market," and therefore,
had not been subjected to the premarket approval process. 277 The court noted
that the FDA's acceptance of a claim of substantial equivalence does not in any
way denote official approval of the device.278 Furthermore, the court indicated
that "meritorious claims.., would not contravene FDA'approval' of the device
and would further Congressional intent by providing pacemaker
manufacturers a product safety incentive in those areas where the premarket
approval process has failed adequately to protect the consumer. 279 Therefore,
the court rejected Pacesetter's claim of preemption and upheld the jury's
finding in favor of the plaintiff on the breach of implied warranty claim.280
The Hawaii Supreme Court's determination that the premarket approval
process is not a specific requirement under the MDA and does not trigger a
claim of preemption conflicts with the First Circuit's finding to the contrary
King v. Collagen.281 In light of the legislative history of the original version of
the Amendments, if the device has been subject to the scientific review process,
tort claims imposing additional requirements would be preempted.282
The Hawaii Supreme Court in Larsen283 appropriately recognized, however,
that devices which enter the market on a claim of substantial equivalence
should not be preempted under the section 521(a) of the MDA. Since devices
which are placed on the market based upon a claim of "substantial equivalence"
to a device already on the market have not been subjected to the strict scrutiny
which the premarket approval entails, the potential for dangerous and
defective devices causing injury to consumers is greatly enhanced. In addition,
although the Larsens' claim was based on warranty, it would seem that
additional tort claims should not be preempted in these circumstances.
The distinction recognized in Larsen between devices which have undergone
full premarket and devices which are claimed to be "substantially equivalent"
is appropriate, in light of the injuries which may result from a Class III device
on a claim of "substantial equivalence," and therefore, had not been subjected to the full
rigor of the premarket approval process. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1423, n.6.
277 Larsen, 837 P.2d at 1282.
2781d. (citing H.R. REP. No. 108, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1990) reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6307).
279 Larsen, 837 P.2d at 1282.
2801d. at 1287,
281983 F.2d. 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).
2 8 2 See DANIEL F. O'KEEFE & ROBERT A. SIEGEL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW INSTITUTE, An
Analytical Legislative History of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976: An
Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 1114 (1976).
283837 P.2d at 1273.
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which enters the market without appropriate testing or scientific review.284 If
a device has not undergone premarket approval, the FDA has not made a
determination sufficient to provide a reasonable assurance of safety with
respect to that device. Furthermore, the FDA has not promulgated any specific
requirement applicable to the device under the MDA. Therefore, a claim of
preemption by the manufacturer of the product should not survive.
Transitional Devices
Prior to the enactment of the MDA, some devices were regulated as drugs
so that the FDA could exert its regulatory powers over the device.285 This
category of devices is called "transitional devices."28 6 Under the MDA,
transitional devices should be reclassified as Class III devices under the
MDA.287
The MDA of 1976 were enacted largely in response to the IUD crisis.2 88 Prior
to the enactment of the MDA, intrauterine devices were classified as drugs so
that the FDA could exert its regulatory powers over the device.2 89 The FD&C
Act of 1938 does not contain a preemptive provision similar to section 521(a)
of the MDA. Therefore, courts which have considered whether claims arising
from IUDs, which were regulated as drugs prior to enactment of the MDA,
have generally held that a plaintiff's tort law claims based on inadequate
warning and design defects are not preempted. 290
Some IUDs, however, are now regulated under the MDA as Class III
devices. 291 Since the regulations prescribe specific performance standards and
design requirements, a claim arising from an IUD regulated under the MDA
and the specific regulations promulgated thereunder would most likely be
preempted. 292
2841d.
28 5See Staff of Subcomni. on Oversight and Investigations, Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., Medical Device Regulation: The FDA's Neglected Child 2 (Comm.
Print 1983).
286
"Transitional devices are those products now known as Medical Devices which
were regulated as drugs prior to the passage of the Amendments." Boguslaski, supra
note 3, at 426.
28 7See S. Rep. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1070, 1071.
288 See Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (Minn. 1988).
289FD&C Act, § 521(a), as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360K (1976).
290See Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); Callan v. G.D. Searle,
709 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D.
Minn. 1988); Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024 (D. N.J. 1988).
29121 C.F.R. § 801.427 (1993); 21 C.F.R. § 884 (1993).
292/d.
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Investigational Devices
In addition to the foregoing analysis of Class I, II, and III claims, the
categorization of a device as an investigational device,293 a custom device,294
or a transitional device2 95 may affect the preemption analysis. Recently, the
Seventh Circuit has considered a claim of preemption with respect to a claim
arising from a defective intraocular implant.296 Intraocular implants are
exempted from the premarket approval process under the MDA because they
are investigational devices under the MDA. 297 The intraocular lens
investigational device exemption is the subject of a specific regulation
promulgated by the FDA under the MDA.2
98
The specific regulations applicable to investigational devices require a local
institutional review board to review and approve any experimental protocol
applicable to a medical device used in clinical investigational trials.299 The
regulations require that all participants in investigational studies be fully
informed of all risks associated with the device or the procedure for
implantation.
3 0 0
In Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp.,30 1 the plaintiff consented to the
implantation of an experimental intraocular lens. Subsequently, the intraocular
implant had to be removed because of a defect which caused it to cocoon in the
eye. The plaintiff sustained permanent eye injury as the result of the
2 9 3
se FD&C Act, § 520(g), as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g); see also 21 C.F.R. § 812 -
Investigation Device Exemptions.
2 9 4
"Custom device" means a device that:
(1) Necessarily deviates from devices generally available or from an
applicable performance standard on premarket approval requirement
in order to comply with the order of an individual physician or dentist;
(2) Is not generally available to or generally used by, other physicians or
dentists;
(3) Is not generally available in finished form for purchase or for
dispensing upon prescription;
(4) Is not offered for commercial distribution through labeling or adver-
tising, and
(5) Is intended for use by an individual patient named in the order of a
physician or dentist, and is to be made in a specific form for that patient,
or is intended to meet the special needs of the physician or dentist in the
course of professional practice.
21 C.F.R. § 812(3) (1993); FD&C Act, 520(b), as codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b).
2 9 5 See supra note 287.
2 9 6Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 756 F. Supp. 370 (Ill. 1991), affid, 961 F.2d 1330
(1992).
29721 C.F.R. § 813.1(b) (1993).
2981d.
2 9 91d. § 812.62.
30021 U.S.C. § 813.66(a)(6) (1993).
301961 F.2d. 1330 (7th Cir. 1992).
1992-93]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
implantation and removal of the device. The intraocular lens was ultimately
withdrawn from the market because of the defect.302
The plaintiff asserted a cause of action against the manufacturer under state
law based on negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty.303
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer had performed
inadequate clinical testing of the product, failed to warn the public of the
dangers of the product, and defectively designed the product. Optical
Radiation claimed that the plaintiff's claims were preempted under
section 521(a) of the MDA. 304
The plaintiff conceded that "insofar as the complaint might be construed to
allege that Illinois tort law required the defendant to do more or different
clinical testing of [the device] than required by the FDA's regulations," the claim
was preempted. 305 With respect to the design defect claim, the plaintiff argued
that since the FDA's regulations applicable to investigational devices "impose
no requirements concerning the design of the intraocular lens," the claim of
defective design was not preempted.30 6 Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that
a finding of preemption would leave the plaintiff remediless.307
The court rejected both arguments, stating that:
The argument assumes that the only federal requirement that might
relate to the safety or effectiveness of the design of a medical device
would be an actual specification of that design... In the experimental
phase the appropriate regulations of safety and effectiveness are
procedural rather than substantive ones. They do not specify the safe
and effective design; they specify the procedures for determining
whether the experimental design is safe and effective. These are
requirements relating to safety and effectiveness and they can therefore
have preemptive effect.
30 8
Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim that preemption in these
circumstances would leave the consuming public remediless.309 The court
stated that the scope of preemption under the Act is "limited to efforts by states
to impose sanctions for compliance with federal regulations relating to the
safety and efficacy of experimental lenses.' 310 The Act would not affect cases
3 02 1d. at 1332.
3 0 31d. at 1330.
3041d. at 1331.
3 0 5 Slater, 961 F.2d at 1333.
3 0 61d.
3 0 7 Id.
3 0 81d.
309SIater, 961 F.2d at 1333.
310Id. at 1334.
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charging negligence in the implantation of the lens, bacterial contamination of
the lens, or failure to obtain informed consent to the implantation or removal
of the lens. 311 Therefore, a patient who does not receive informed consent could
recover damages on this basis.312
Under Judge Posner's analysis in Slater,313 a plaintiff who has consented to
participate in a clinical investigation of a device under the guidelines set forth
in the regulations will not be able to recover for injuries related to the device
on the basis of failure to warn, negligent testing, or design defects.314 However,
a patient's common law rights arising outof medical battery, informed consent,
or negligent insertion of a medical device are preserved outside the scope of
preemption of section 521(a) of the MDA. 3 15
lV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the MDA presents a complex
scheme of federal regulation which defies a simple analysis of federal
preemption. An understanding of the classification scheme under the MDA is
necessary to predict whether a state tort law claim will be preempted under the
MDA. Courts may reach different results, depending on whether the device is
a Class I, II, or III device, or whether it has entered the market on a claim that
it was "substantially equivalent" to a device already on the market. In addition,
claims arising out of transitional devices may not be preempted under the
Medical Devices Act, whereas, most claims based on investigational devices
will be preempted unless the patient did not consent to the implantation of the
device.
After determining how the device has been classified under the MDA, it is
necessary to identify any specific regulations applicable to the device under
the MDA, such as performance standards, labeling, or warning requirements
imposed by the FDA. If a specific regulation such as a performance standard
has been promulgated, the scope of preemption must be determined by
referring to the scope of preemption as defined in' the regulations under 21
C.F.R. § 808.1.
Once it has been determined that the state tort claim falls within the scope
of preemption of section 521(a), as defined in the interpretive regulations, the
Cipollone116 analysis must be used to compare each state tort claim to the
specific requirements applicable to the device under the MDA. To determine if
a specific tort claim is preempted by a particular requirement under the Act,
the central inquiry in each case is whether the legal duty of the common law
3111d.
3121d.
313961 F.2d at 1330.
3141d. at 1332.
3 151d. at 1334.
316112 S. Ct. at 2608.
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damages action constitutes a requirement that is different from or in addition
to a specific requirement applicable to the device under the MDA and which
relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device.
Claims of preemption must also be analyzed in light of the underlying policy
considerations of the MDA. It is clear that the major concern of Congress in
enacting the MDA was the protection of public health and safety from defective
and dangerous devices. However, Congress was also concerned that the
imposition of varying state and local requirements on device manufacturers
would unduly burden commerce, and would impede the further research and
development of new devices. The resolution of claims of preemption under
section 521(a) of the MDA must be carefully analyzed to strike an appropriate
balance between these competing concerns.
In situations where the FDA has promulgated specific requirements
applicable to a particular device, a claim of preemption should be upheld,
provided that the manufacturer has complied with all appropriate regulations
and premarket approval requirements under the MDA. Under these
circumstances, the imposition of additional state law requirements would
impose conflicting requirements on device manufacturers which could impose
an undue burden on the continued development and marketing of potentially
lifesaving devices.
In situations where the manufacturer has failed to comply with applicable
regulations under the MDA, however, a claim of preemption should be
resolved against the manufacturer, and in favor of upholding the plaintiff's
claims. In addition, in circumstances where the manufacturer has intentionally
withheld information from the FDA which was necessary to obtain approval
for marketing the device, or has intentionally misrepresented a material risk or
side effect of a device, the manufacturer should not be afforded the protection
of a defense of preemption under the MDA. In addition, in situations where
the FDA has not promulgated any specific requirements applicable to the
particular device under the MDA, tort claims arising from injury related to a
device should not be preempted.
In light of the difficulty the FDA has encountered keeping defective and
dangerous medical devices from entering the market, care must be taken not
to preclude an injured person from all remedies arising from defective medical
devices in circumstances where the regulatory scheme fails to detect defective
devices prior to their introduction into the medical market. An injured person
should be afforded an opportunity to recover his medical expenses and other
damages resulting from the implantation of a device which is clearly defective.
In enacting the MDA, Congress did not create a private federal remedy for
consumers who are injured by defective devices. Since the major goal of the
MDA, as enacted in 1976, was to protect the public from defective and unsafe
medical devices, it is unlikely that Congress intended to preclude injured
persons from all recovery in the event that they sustain injuries related to a
clearly defective device. Perhaps it is time that Congress clarify this issue by
more clearly stating the effect of the Act on state tort law remedies. If Congress
did intend to preempt state tort law remedies, then perhaps itis time to consider
the creation of a private federal remedy under the MDA to ensure that injured
consumers are compensated for medical expenses and other losses incurred as
the result of a defective medical devices.
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